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1 
Abstract 
  
Ethnic conflict in Latin America has pervaded the region since the colonization of the 
Spanish. This tension has been present between Latin America’s extremely diverse ethnic 
groups, social classes, and state governments. In specific instances, the region has shown that 
consolidation under conflict is possible. Due to the ever-widening gap between the wealthy, 
Caucasian elite and the Indigenous, or otherwise ethnic, minority, groups of rebelling ethnic 
individuals have combined in the face of the shared threat of repression and inequality. When 
faced with increasing hardship, in order to form long-lasting, large rebellions, ethnic minorities 
can replace their highly salient, specific ethnic identities with the broad identity of “being ethnic” 
or “being a minority”. This process is shown using an agent-based model that was developed 
with the goal of understanding the relationship between the costs of secession/rebellion, the 
strength of attachment that ethnic individuals feel towards their identities, and the impact of a 
highly severe, repressive environment. From the model, it can be concluded that while rebellions 
that are formed by individuals with highly salient ethnic identities are often quicker to develop, 
rebel movements that are created and grown by individuals who have more moderate 
attachments are able to better succeed. Also, rebellions can be formed from multiple ethnic 
groups if faced with a severe enough situation, a shared willingness to set aside ethnic 
differences, and mutual status of being “ethnic”.  
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Introduction 
 
There are over 800 confirmed separate Indigenous groups in Latin America (CEPAL, 
2014, p. 7). In a country like Bolivia, a reported 41% of Bolivians have Indigenous origins 
(Minority Rights Group, 2018). Historically, this level of diversity has caused widespread issues 
of representation and constant human rights violations. Following independence from the 
Spanish, Latin America has been influenced by military and civilian violence, extreme poverty, 
high-level corruption, and has been denied a presence in international politics and economics. 
Even though Latin America has, in general, become more democratic, corruption is still deeply 
ingrained and Latin Americans have increasing levels of mistrust in their governments; 
Indigenous peoples, specifically, even more so lack faith in the good will of their respective 
states (Inter-American Development Bank, 2016). Indigenous groups have been significantly 
poorer than non-Indigenous populations, they are consistently excluded from seats in their 
governments, and they often lack access to modern amenities (such as healthcare, electricity, and 
transportation). With the worsening of widespread corruption, as exposed in the recent Petrobras 
scandal, questions have to be asked about the response of Latin America’s millions of 
Indigenous peoples.    
There have been very few separatist movements worldwide that have ever been truly 
successful, but due to Latin America’s ever increasing hardships in addition to the very strong 
non-state bonds that come along with salient ethnic identities, Latin America may be in the 
position where widespread rebellion and/or secession could flourish. The region has had its fair 
share of secessionist movements and rebellions, many of which had some level of success. 
Horowitz (1985) states that “the strength of a secessionist movement and the heterogeneity of its 
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region are inversely related” (p. 267). He goes on to say that secessionist movements like this 
often end up divided and weak because those seeking independence are often quite politically 
and ethnically dissimilar. However, in the case of Latin American Indigenous rebellions, those 
rebelling are often fighting for the same cause and hoping for the same outcomes. The high 
dissatisfaction Indigenous citizens have with their governments, paired with long-standing ethnic 
tensions and high levels of diversity could lead to successful rebellions.  
Separatist movements and ethnic rebellions often fail because of external intervention, 
the high costs of secession, or the fleeting nature of ethnically driven conflict. While this may be 
true, it ignores the possibility for multi-ethnic collaborations making secession and rebellion 
more successful. The idea of a shared identity of “being ethnic” or “being Indigenous” rather 
than being of a specific ethnic or Indigenous group could lead to large groups of similar people. 
This is a historically supported phenomenon in Latin America, stemming back to the 1700s 
rebellions against Spain’s limitations. Time and time again, there have been rebel and/or 
secessionist movements in the region that combine Indigenous groups in order to form majorities 
and pool resources. The widespread, severe issues of corruption and lack of representation 
combined with the modern spread of information may, in the future, allow this ability to form 
successful multi-ethnic rebellions; this theory is in opposition to common beliefs that cultural 
differences and costs prevent such an event from occurring. Considering this phenomenon in the 
modern age is important; in the past the language barrier was much more severe, Natives had 
very little access to complicated weaponry, and communication technology was not widely 
available. With new phones, widespread common languages in the region like Spanish and 
English, and new platforms for Indigenous political leaders, the limitations of the past are less 
likely to lead to the end of rebellions.  
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While case examples of this consolidation of minority groups is historically documented, 
more recent cases are hard to discern due to both the slow progression of such movements and 
lack of news coverage on Native issues. By using an agent-based model in order to mimic the 
current social circumstances of Latin America and the Indigenous groups there, micro-level 
patterns of Indigenous actors under strain can be established. With the ties of both ethnic and 
national attachment on an individual level, the model is able to discern the driving forces behind 
this proposed consolidation and the success of rebel or secessionist movements.  
 
Background 
 
Defining Latin American Ethnicity 
 
Latin America’s extreme ethnic diversity is an important factor to consider when 
discussing ethnicity in the region. In this case, ethnicity and ethnic groups are being defined as 
groups with shared descent-based attributes (Chandra, 2006, p. 397). These groups can be 
defined very broadly as an overarching label like Caucasian or Native American, however, as 
discussed in an article by Indian Country Today, there may be a preference to label each 
individual tribe (with their own unique governing system, culture, and heritage) as its own ethnic 
group (Champagne, 2014). Throughout this paper, the broad ethnic group of Native American or 
Indigenous will be used but each tribe will also be considered as subset ethnic groups. 
 In a country like Argentina, 85% of their population is considered Caucasian. 
Caucasians, in this context, are people who arrived post-colonization and have fully European 
ancestry. There have been many waves of immigration since colonization, the most influential 
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being post-World War II and its influx of Jewish, Italian, and other European groups. Caucasians 
who have emigrated more recently are often extremely wealthy compared to the local 
populations. An example of the impact of emigrated wealth is Juan Carlos Varela, the former 
president of Panama and a descendant of a line of politically connected millionaires (Czark, 
2016). Criollo people (also commonly spelled as Creole, but not to be confused with the Haitian 
Creoles) are those who are of pure Spanish descent, but were not born in Spain, specifically from 
families stemming from the colonial era (those born in Spain in the colonial era are called 
Peninsulares), and in most counts are considered Caucasian. However, Criollos are socially and 
culturally dissimilar from more recent European immigrants. In the colonial era, the Natives and 
Criollos had the “shared fatality of trans-Atlantic birth” (Anderson, 2006, p. 57). The Criollos 
were both not able to truly benefit from the extractive and superior nature of Spanish 
colonialism, but they were also not as harshly repressed as the “savage” Natives. The following 
quote from Simón Bolívar’s Letter from Jamaica explains the Criollo struggle when considering 
the fight for independence from the Spanish: 
We are neither Indians nor Europeans, but a species midway between the legitimate owners of the 
land and the Spanish usurpers. Being Americans by birth and Europeans by right, we must both 
dispute the claims of Natives and resist external invasion. Thus, we find ourselves in the most 
extraordinary and complicated situation. (Bolívar, 1815) 
In the modern era, Criollos of purely Spanish colonial descent are very uncommon as 
intermixing occurred more and more often after the end of colonialism. What has replaced 
Criollos as an ethnic group that is not quite Caucasian but not culturally Native American, are 
the Mestizos. The term Mestizos was defined in the past as people of mixed Caucasian and 
Native American descent. Today, however, Mestizo is used as a term for someone who does not 
necessarily have salient Native roots but have some Native heritage. Mestizos make up the 
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majority of most country populations in Latin America. Native Americans (or AmerIndians) are 
also extremely populous in some countries, specifically Peru, Guatemala, and Bolivia where 
Natives make up the majority of each country’s total population (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2020). Native Americans, as members of the broad ethnic group, are in one way or another 
affiliated culturally and genetically with a tribe. They face different struggles from the 
Caucasians and Mestizos of the region. “Indigenous Peoples face poverty rates that are on 
average twice as high as for the rest of Latin Americans,” Natives are often poor and lack social 
support and without the use of international agencies to act as a voice for these people there is 
little chance for positive change (Calvo-González, 2016). In addition to these groups, there are 
even smaller ethnic minority groups: Asians, Mulattoes, Africans, Zambos, and Pardos.   
 There have been multiple attempts to unite Latin America’s ethnic groups. Bolívar 
dreamed of a single overarching Latin American state, but his vision quickly deteriorated in the 
years leading up to his death. It was impossible to govern people in regional areas that were hard 
to access, and due to the ever-present ethnic diversity, groups struggled to agree on overaching 
governing systems. Bolívar had to accept that Latin America was not the United States, even 
though he wished to model Latin American countries off of the new US model (Pagden, 1990, p. 
139). While the United States was able to join together under mutual distaste for European rule 
(and due to Native genocide, did not have to deal with many Native rebellions), Latin America 
was too large and too wildly diverse for a single state to become a reality. Continuing this desire, 
the “united/cosmic race” or la raza cosmica was a term coined by a 1929 Mexican presidential 
candidate, José Vasconcelos, to describe his desire for a single, linked race of people that had no 
ties to ethnicity or color. Simultaneously, Vasconcelos wanted to prove that Latin American 
people were not inferior, that Latin American cultures were valuable, but also that they didn’t 
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actually matter and that those cultures could be easily consolidated. He also vouched for 
eugenics, which makes him even more contradictory, but his racial views of a low ethnicity Latin 
America were propagated in his time period (Chiu et al., 2013). “Indigenismo” as a political 
ideology of bringing Natives under the control of the state and assimilating Native culture with 
Mestizo culture has been rampant throughout the past two centuries.  
There has been a shift since around 1989 in how the state has to respond to Native culture 
and representation. The International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Convention No. 169 
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries takes the approach of 
“fundamental respect for the cultures, ways of life, traditions, and customary laws of these 
peoples as enduring peoples” (Dandler, 1999, p.122) State governments must also consult and 
have representation from Native groups, also the governments must recognize that some tribes 
have been separated by state borders and allow for communication. State constitutions have also 
been amended in recent years in many states including Guatemala, Colombia, and Brazil, and 
these amendments often reinforce the international regulations. The election of Evo Morales in 
Bolivia in 2005 was unprecedented because he was raised in an impoverished Native 
environment and served to represent the interests of his own Native group and others around 
Bolivia. Mestizo leaders have also been more common, notable examples include Lula de Silva 
in Brazil and Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador.  
 
Modern Latin American Corruption and Social Issues 
 
 While some Latin American countries are labelled as democracies, even those countries 
have major problems in the way that the law impacts each individual and each social group. 
8 
Guillermo O’Donnell argues that there are five main gaps in the rule of law in Latin America: 
flaws in existing laws, uneven application of the law, exploitative relations between 
bureaucracies and ordinary citizens, poor access to the judiciary and fair process, and sheer 
lawlessness. The combination of these problems, O’Donnell states, “indicate a severe 
incompleteness of the state” (O’Donnell, 1999, p. 314). There are still laws that discriminate 
against women and minorities even in states that are labelled political democracies. Wealthy 
people very rarely have to face legal issues, but people who are both poor and innocent often 
cannot even defend themselves (or face discrimination in the judicial system when they do). 
There are no allowances for people without transportation to get to court and if an Indigenous 
person speaks a less common language there is little hope for a translator (Garro, 1999, p. 282). 
 Corruption plagues both local and state governments, from presidents to traffic cops. 
Rose-Ackerman (2016) describes grand corruption as corruption occurring “at the highest levels 
of government” and can be exemplified by government official bribe taking leading towards 
favoritism to certain private firms or biased votes in legislation (p. 27). The Petrobras scandal 
(also known as Operation Car Wash or the Odebrecht scandal) is a very recent and still ongoing 
investigation into the scheme of continent-wide money laundering. The investigation started in 
2014 and concerned individuals (known as doleiros, a person who exchanges money on the black 
market) who used gas stations and car washes to legitimize illegally gained funds. However, it 
was soon uncovered that behind these doleiros was an executive from Brazil’s state-owned oil 
company, Petrobras, who confessed to have been “deliberately overpaying on contracts with 
various suppliers for office construction, drilling rigs, refineries and exploration vessels” 
(Gutterman, 2019, p. 198). The excess money would then go into a fund used to pay politicians 
who would in turn support Petrobras executives in a cycle of bribery and vote buying. Former 
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Brazilian president Lula de Silva was sentenced to 12 years in prison for his involvement with 
the scandal, signaling the possible end to the “Pink Tide” or the wave of leftist regimes that had 
pervaded Latin America in the 2000s. From Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela to Ollanta Humala in 
Peru, dozens of politicians and company executives were charged with bribe taking in 
connection to Operation Car Wash. While some sources say corruption is on the downward trend 
in the region, many Latin Americans would disagree. From surveys done by Transparency 
International (2019), ¼ of citizens in Latin America have been offered money for their vote and 
65% think that their government is run by private interests. There is an argument to be made 
about the possibility of Latin American corruption being on the decline as Operation Car Wash 
was a positive change that was quite successful at prosecuting the high-level politicians who 
were involved. However, recently there have been violent protests from Native groups fighting 
over environmental rights and civil rights. With the election of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and the 
ousting of Evo Morales in Bolivia, Native rights in many regions are more fragile than ever with 
the return of neo-liberal policies and right-wing leadership. In a recent speech on January 23, 
2020, Bolsonaro stated, “The Indians are evolving, more and more they are human beings like 
us” (Universo Online, 2020). Also, in front of Congress in 2016 saying, “In 2019 we’re going to 
rip up Raposa Serra do Sol (Brazilian Native land). We’re going to give all the ranchers guns” 
(Shenoy, 2019). Or in Bolivia where interim president Jeanine Anez speaking of former 
Indigenous president Evo Morales, “Let’s not even allow the arbitrary, the violent and the savage 
return to power. I think that it is the responsibility of all of us” (Bender, 2020).  
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Historical Rebellion, Secession, and Consolidation 
 
To support the underlying theory that groups that are ethnically or culturally dissimilar 
have the ability to consolidate when faced with intense hardships, it is necessary to view the 
historical examples of such cases. While many minority groups could theoretically exemplify 
this phenomenon, Indigenous groups present the most compelling cases. Native groups are often 
viewed together as one people, but many tribes are extremely culturally and linguistically 
dissimilar and often co-exist in close proximity. Latin America is prime ground for seeing 
possible consolidation because of the wide variety of Native groups, a history of lack of 
representation and injustices for minorities, and for extreme ethnic and linguistic diversity; the 
region is fairly unique in these traits, however, the United States’ Indigenous groups throughout 
history could also be viewed for possible examples.  From 1712 to 2019, there are numerous 
cases under which ethnic consolidation under stress occurred in the Western Hemisphere. 
Examples of this phenomenon highlight the reasons why consolidation occurs in the first place, 
why some rebellions failed, and what would be necessary to form a successful, ethnically 
heterogeneous secessionist movement.  
 
Mexico’s Tzeltal Rebellion 
 
 The Tzetal Rebellion of 1712 occurred during the Spanish colonization of Central and 
South America, however, it is relevant to modern day struggles for Indigenous sovereignty. The 
reasons for the rebellion were somewhat similar to other fights for independence by people 
repressed by their colonizers; although, the way in which the rebellion was conducted was 
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unprecedented for the region. The Spanish were simultaneously religiously and economically 
motivated to colonize and thus established numerous missions throughout the southwestern 
United States and northern Mexico. Instead of fully embodying Spanish Catholicism, Natives 
combined new Catholic symbols, figures, and hierarchies with their own local deities, 
hierarchies, and ceremonies. The Tzeltal Rebellion of 1712 occurred in response primarily to a 
dramatic lack of representation and increasing taxes and tithes (Klein, 1966, p. 249). Eventually, 
when hardship stemmed from the exploitative nature of Spanish colonialism, religion was at the 
forefront of the battle due to the highly religious nature of the situation. Native religious cults 
formed around the idea of the Virgin Mary; Klein (1966) states that they saw her as “an avenging 
agent who would wipe out the oppression and lift the yoke from the shoulders of her suffering 
followers” (p. 255). With the influence of Sebastian Gomez de la Gloria, a Tzoltil man claiming 
to be divinely given the position of bishop, paired with the impressionable, struggling Natives, a 
cult called the Church of the Virgin was created. The cult created governmental structures, 
appointed leaders, collected taxes, and then organized a massive rebellion of Natives. “Small 
mutinies began to occur apparently spontaneously, throughout the Tzeltal region,” Native leaders 
of dozens of Tzeltal speaking towns came together in a confederation against all enemies until 
the Spaniards were destroyed (p. 254). They quickly put together thousands of men and had a 
multi-front battle plan. The major limiting factor for not growing followers was the language 
barrier present between Indigenous languages; those speaking the Tzeltal language were able to 
join but other tribes hesitated. Gomez de Gloria’s government was not hastily planned but the 
rebellion burned out fairly quickly due to quick Spanish response and a lack of access to modern 
weaponry. “Had the proper arms existed, there is every reason to suppose a more successful 
outcome might have resulted,” if this rebellion had occurred in modern day with modern 
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communication, current cheap and accessible weaponry, and easier transportation, the rebellion 
may have been much more long lasting (p. 263). 
 
Pontiac’s War 
 
 Farther north and with a different colonizer, a similar situation arose nearly half a century 
later. The Natives in today’s mid-western United States rebelled after becoming a conquered 
people instead of allies. They had been used to friendly trading with the French, but the status 
quo changed dramatically after the French defeat in the French and Indian War. The British 
considered the Natives to be savages so, unlike the French, they decided on an end to gift giving 
and intermarriage, nor would they need permission to build forts on Native land. They thought 
the Natives would follow orders because they were afraid of the British (Gasparro, 2007, p. 46). 
Fort Detroit was taken over by the British after the war, thus the fort no longer sold ammunition 
or weapons to the Natives. The leaders of the newly occupied fort then limited where the Natives 
could hunt. In 1761, the Natives started their response to the unfriendly British, Seneca leaders 
went to Detroit to ask for the assistance of the Ottawas, Hurons, and Chippewas in an attack on 
Fort Detroit. However, the plan was discovered and instead continuing with the plan, the Natives 
chose to wait until they had even more followers. The Delawares, Shawnees, Mingoes, and 
Potawotamies then joined after a “prophet” started preaching that the Natives were being 
punished for allowing the British to come onto their land (Gasparro, 2007, p. 48). Pontiac, an 
Ottawa leader, called for a grand council and came up with a complicated plan to subtly spy on 
the fort for information prior to attacking. The siege lasted for six months ending with a 
stalemate and many British killed. Then there were numerous other victories: Fort Sandusky, 
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Fort St. Joseph, Fort Miami, Fort Ouiatenon, Fort Michilimackinac, and a multitude more. With 
more victories, even initially hesitant Natives joined the fight. The Natives were constantly 
underestimated which made them so successful, plus the sheer manpower from the numerous 
tribes joining together made their victories possible. Unlike the Tzeltal Rebellion, the colonizers 
were not prepared and did not start to seriously counteract the Natives until ten forts had already 
fallen. The rebellion was quashed when the British dispensed the smallpox blankets, the same 
blankets that are so often discussed as accidentally given in American history (Ranlet, 2000, p. 
427). The combination of germ warfare and the eventual appearance of the British Army led to 
the end of Pontiac’s War. However, the war is an example of how numerous Native tribes can 
come together, no matter their cultural differences, under the right circumstances.  
 
Peru’s Tupac-Amaru II 
 
Peru’s colonial era saw a constant stream of Native rebellions in response to the Spanish 
invasion into their lands. Prior to colonization, the Incas were spread along most of the western 
coast of South America; by the 1570’s, however, a large proportion of their population and their 
government was completely destroyed. The list of grievances held by the Natives in the region of 
Bolivia and Peru were similar to the problems faced by the Mexican Natives. The Incan 
originating Natives were often forced to perform labor in mines, were unable to be recognized in 
court, and often had no say to their conditions, taxes, or rights. Jose Gabriel Tupac Amaru was 
the direct descendant of the last Inca emperor, Tupac Amaru I, but struggled with claiming his 
titles and the Spanish governors (corregidores) questioned his legitimacy (Campbell, 1979, p. 8). 
These governors were also the authorities which had been heavily taxing and exploiting the 
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Natives. The Tupac Amaru rebellion began in 1780 with the execution of a corregidor, Governor 
Arriaga, and following this Tupac Amaru asked for followers “of every quality and condition” to 
end the harsh treatment by the corregidores. Tupac Amaru freed the black slaves and then was 
able to amass an army of over 60,000 men within only a few months. Amaru stated, "I have 
acted... to preserve the peace and well-being of Indians, mestizos, mambos, as well as Native-
born whites and blacks” (Chambers and Chasteen, 2010, p. 33). His supporters consisted of 
numerous Native groups of the region and of people of differing languages. The goal was to help 
the people suffering from Spanish control, no matter their ethnicity. Eventually, the rebellion was 
ended by a traitor after a series of overwhelming Native victories. Tupac Amaru was executed, 
but even with his death, the rebellions in Peru did not stop, “Nearly every part of the viceroyalty 
of Peru suffered from some form of rebellion, although not all of these were directly tied to the 
Tupac Amaru revolt” (Campbell, 1979, p. 11). 
 
Mexico’s Zapatista Movement 
 
 Chiapas, the southernmost state of Mexico, has a Native population that makes up 27% of 
the state. There are 12 main Native groups, but there are 56 recognized Indigenous languages in 
the region (Government of Chiapas, 2020). The EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación 
Nacional) or the Zapatista Army of National Liberation is a socialist, militant group that formed 
in response to the lack of Native representation in the Mexican government. However, the 
driving force behind the group was NAFTA and the fears at the time that international goods 
would harm local business which Natives relied on for their livelihoods; the EZLN released their 
First Declaration and Revolutionary Laws on the day that NAFA went into effect on January 1, 
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1994. They declared war on Mexico and the EZLN’s supporters consisted of numerous Native 
groups that had been subject to repression by the Mexican government, including the Tzeltal, 
Tzotzil, Chol, and Tjobal Native groups (Godelmann, 2014). Two years after the initial uprising 
and hundreds of deaths later, the San Andres Peace Accords were signed in support of Native 
self-determination. This did not stop the fighting and did not satisfy the group’s requests but over 
the past two decades the EZLN has reshaped Native representation in Mexico and has allowed 
for increased Native autonomy. Additionally, in the 2000s, the group stated in its Sixth 
Declaration that it stood to represent “all the exploited and dispossessed of Mexico” (Zapatista 
Army, 2005, p. 10). 
 
Bolivia: Kataristas to Evo Morales 
 
While secession and separatist movements are rare, the drive of Indigenous groups to 
gain representation or independence from their countries is historically abundant in Central and 
South America. Bolivia, until recently the poorest country in South America (now surpassed 
only by Venezuela) and simultaneously the most Indigenous (by percentage of total population), 
has struggled with a lack of representation for their Native class. Around 50% of Bolivia’s 
population belongs to one of the country’s 36 Native groups; however, until 2005, there was very 
little representation for them in the government and often they were the poorest and least 
educated of the entire country (Gigler, 2009, p. 30). Bolivia has had a sordid past of military 
dictatorships and repressive regimes, but since 1985 they have been labelled as a democracy. 
Though given the title of a democratic regime, numerous corrupt presidents have abused the 
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rights of citizens and have brought the country more economic hardship (see the Cochabamba 
Water War and Plan Dignidad).  
Looking back through Bolivia's history it becomes clear that Bolivia stands as the best 
example of the consolidation of a minority or Indigenous class when dealing with hardship. 
Native peoples did not gain many civic rights in Bolivia until 1952 and even then there were 
multiple instances of an attempt to socialize this new Indigenous peasant class into Spanish-
Bolivian culture. A brief democratic moment in 1952 turned into military dictatorship after 
military dictatorship for three decades (Albó, 1994, p. 58). The dictatorship under General 
Banzer starting in 1970 contained some of the worst atrocities of mass slaughter. 3,000 political 
opponents were arrested, 200 were killed, and thousands of citizens were tortured; the Ministry 
of the Interior even gained the nickname "The Horror Chambers" as that where most of these 
political prisoners were held (Schipani, 2009). The Katarista movement, named after Tupac 
Katari, the leader of a failed 1781 rebellion against the Spanish, started in the 1960s both in the 
cities and the rural areas among the Natives as a cultural reawakening. However, after Banzer’s 
reign and subsequent massacre, the rural Aymara people turned against the government (even 
though the Aymara were the least affected by the Banzer regime as they are located in very rural 
parts of Bolivia). The Aymaras quickly grew support among the other Native groups by using an 
emphasis on tradition and their common origins. In 1980, Bolivia saw the first nominations of 
people from the Indigenous peasant class as leftist candidates. Between 1982 and 1985, Bolivia 
went through its last major democratic hurdle to end the era of post colonization violence. But 
with the rewriting of their constitution and a delay on the Indigenous proposed legislation due to 
the new democratic government, there was reduced trust in the Katarista movement, there was 
17 
also internal struggles in the overarching movement which led into a split into two major parties, 
MRTK and MITKA. MRTK then split again into the FULKA and MRTKL (Albó, 1994, p. 67). 
In 2005, Evo Morales was elected president after running a campaign supporting 
expanded Native rights and reshaping the country’s democratic institutions. Between 1994 and 
2005, Morales went from a coca leaf farmer (coca being the natural leaf source of cocaine but 
used in Bolivia for medicinal and religious purposes) and uneducated Indigenous person to the 
political leader of the country and the first high-level representation for the large Native 
population (Brienen, 2016, p. 78). He ran under his own political party “Movement Towards 
Socialism” or MAS-IPSP (IPSP: Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples); an 
important thing to note is that MAS is not truly a socialist party (Morales claims MAS to be 
closer to communitarianism), but Morales used the name of the defunct party “Movement 
Towards Socialism” in 1994 as he did not have time to register a new name. People were rabid to 
support him after years of hardship and extreme poverty and he was the first president ever in 
Bolivia to be elected with an absolute majority. Morales was then in power until 2019, but his 
presidency was widely denigrated by Bolivia’s wealthy, non-Indigenous elite. He was supported 
by his broad Native supporter base even through obvious constitutional violations, environmental 
abuses, and corruption charges against some of the members of his cabinet. Morales’ supporter 
base is a case of high ethnic attachment paired with a highly severe situation leaving Natives 
with no other choice than to join together to support a common goal.   
The 2019 election for Bolivia’s presidency caused a major case of democratic backsliding 
which has impacted the Native population significantly. While Bolivia established a two-term 
limit for the presidency in 2009, Evo Morales chose to ignore it and went to the Bolivians 
Supreme Court to change their constitution. This was not a popular decision and when issues 
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started occurring in the 2019 presidential election, people immediately suspected vote 
manipulation. Massive protests broke out that night and within days Bolivian police were firing 
tear gas and rubber bullets at protesters that tried to reach Morales’ recently built, multi-million-
dollar skyscraper. Morales then resigned after being pressured by the people and the military, 
even though he won the election, in order to keep the peace. However, the damage to democracy 
was done. Most other members of MAS also left the government, there was widespread 
confusion, no one wanted to take up the presidency, protests continued and only got more 
violent. Jeanine Áñez is currently interim president. Áñez describes herself as right-wing and 
anti-Morales. 31 people have died since Áñez took office, most of those people being Indigenous 
Morales supporters. She claimed that she would set a new date for a legitimate election, 
however, that has not occurred (Faiola and Krygier, 2019). Bolivia's democracy worsens each 
day as protests continue, more deaths are caused, and a new right-wing leader has been replacing 
parts of the government that, in the past, have functioned democratically. Native peoples have 
once again joined together under a common goal to fight against this non-Native ruler. 
  
The Why of Ethnic Rebellion 
 
 In summary of the preceding cases, there are certain patterns that emerge when 
considering Native rebellions in the West. They were all caused by some severe damage to 
Native rights to representation, land, self-determination, and/or cultural individuality. 
Additionally, in the case studies, a way of increasing their success was through group 
consolidation. While Native groups are all labelled under the overarching label “Indigenous”, 
each group (or tribe) has their own unique culture and possibly their own language. Even so, 
19 
because they share an ethnic label, and similar grievances with their colonizer or government, 
they have been able to combine in order to be a more effective force.  
There are different arguments by various authors on exactly why ethnic rebellion, or 
rebellion in general, occurs and these arguments are important to consider when creating a model 
that exemplifies the patterns of rebellion. According to Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010), 
there are three factors in which ethnic conflict against a government is more likely to occur, “(1) 
the more representatives of an ethnic group are excluded from state power, especially if they 
experienced a loss of power in the recent past, (2) the higher their mobilizational capacity is, and 
(3) the more they have experienced conflict in the past” (p. 87). According to Horowitz (1985), 
“Riots, polarizing elections, or military coups can serve as signs that alternatives to secession are 
unpromising or that negotiations would be futile. Such events catalyze separatism” (p. 262). Gurr 
(1993) comes to a similar finding when viewing communal mobilization post-1945, “that 
cultural identity, inequalities, and historical loss of autonomy all contribute substantially” (p. 
161).  
The mediating factor to why a group would choose to rebel against the state for either 
greater representation or independence, is the cost of secession. There are numerous costs 
associated with attempting to secede from a state that are not only economic but also political. 
Horowitz (2003) argues that even if a secessionist region successfully secedes, the new region 
would still be heterogeneous and that there will always be a minority group. He also states, “A 
secession or partition converts a domestic ethnic dispute into a more dangerous international 
one” (p. 55). The backlash of international actors is a major cost and the risk of warfare or 
violent international suppression rises. Dion states that, “secessionist movements are rooted in 
two types of perceptions: the fear inspired by the union and the confidence inspired by 
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secession… secessions are improbable in well-established democracies because these two 
perceptions are unlikely to exist simultaneously at a high level of intensity” (Dion, 1996, p. 271). 
Secession is highly unlikely or impossible when confidence of success is low and/or fear of the 
state harming the group is low.  In a case where possible success is unknown but a group has a 
reasonable expectation that their culture will be repressed or their economic situation will 
worsen, secession turns into a more beneficial option even with the possible costs.  
 
Modeling Ethnic Consolidation During Rebellion 
 
Model Description 
 
 The following model seeks to reach conclusions concerning the levels of hardship and 
ethnicity necessary to sustain and grow an ethnic rebellion. Netlogo is the program that was used 
to create the following agent-based model; further simplified, Netlogo is a computer program 
under which a user is able to create a simulation with individual agents, all with the goal of 
witnessing how groups of individuals behave under certain conditions. The following image, 
Figure 1, is an image of this thesis’ model of ethnic consolidation prior to the “running” or start 
of the simulation. 
 Using a map of Latin America with current state lines drawn, agents (each representing 
an individual) are dispersed throughout the simulation on available land. The agents each start 
with a variety of attributes that will lead to them making decisions about their chance of rebellion 
as the model progresses. The choices that agents are able to make vary depending on these 
attributes, attributes include: ethnic group, ethnicity (saliency of ethnic identity), patriotism, and 
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natural resources at an agent’s disposal. Agents choose to either avoid, join, or lead rebel 
movements depending on the previously stated factors; they move across the map, using 
resources, finding agents to lead or follow them, and bolster support for their cause. Eventually, 
agents move to cluster into rebel groups across the region and as the severity of the situation 
changes, so do the agents’ choices about the benefits of rebellion.  
 
 
Figure 1: Netlogo Model Interface at Start 
 
 
Variables and Sliders 
 
As stated earlier, there are three conditions discussed by Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 
that increase the chance of rebellion: great exclusion/repression, high mobilization capacity, and 
a past of numerous conflicts. Each of these traits are represented in the model. The increasing 
severity is used to represent the increasing number of conflicts, while the repression and 
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mobilization capacity are found in agents’ attributes. Agents are individually given a random 
Ethnicity value and a random Ethnic Group, the Ethnic Group that the agent belongs to may or 
may not be salient; if an agent is highly attached to their Ethnic Group then their Ethnicity value 
will be close to 1, while if an agent is not attached to their Ethnic Group their Ethnicity value 
will be close to 0. If an agent is highly ethnic they will not be as attached to their state (as 
supported by the evidence of the high rates of dissatisfaction that minorities hold towards their 
governments in Latin America), but they will also be more likely to rebel and join with people of 
their own ethnic group. The last factor which satisfies the high mobilization capacity factor is the 
Resources value. While the elevation of Latin America is not visible in the simulation, each 
patch (small area of land) does have an elevation value that corresponds to its real world 
elevation; the elevation value then corresponds to a natural resources value and a vision radius, 
the rule being: the higher the elevation, the lower the natural resources and the lower the vision 
radius. This is used to approximate the genuine effect of geography on rebel movements; while 
the modern age allows for easier communication, geography still makes physically bringing 
together people who may not have access to fast transportation more difficult. Natural resources 
can also be interpreted to mean that lower elevations, especially coastal areas, will have greater 
access to trade and international goods. In order to mediate the effects of ethnicity and provide a 
fuller image of possible deterrents to secession, agents are also given a random Patriotism value. 
The Patriotism value stays stagnant for each agent throughout the stimulation to represent an 
individual’s political views. 
In addition to the individual agents’ attributes, the user can choose to move various 
sliders in order to more directly impact all of the agents as seen in the following Figure 2. The 
slider Turtle-Proportion is used to increase or decrease population density, #-Ethnic-Groups can 
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change how many completely separate ethnic groups are present, and Boundary-Cross-Threshold 
allows for ethnic individuals to ignore state lines. The slider Global-Ethn-Attach is able to be 
used in order to globally change how important ethnicity is to all individuals. The slider Costs-
of-Secession is the global cost of attempting to rebel against a state; this of course is not 
representative of a real world scenario where different countries face different levels of hardship 
in corruption, but is instead trying to mimic a situation of region-wide corruption and widespread 
international backlash. 
 
Figure 2: Netlogo Sliders 
Severity of hardship is the catalyst that begins group formation, without a difficult 
situation of some sort, there is no reason for rebellion. At the beginning of the simulation, the 
severity of the political and economic situation is set globally to zero, as the model runs the 
hardship severity increases linearly throughout the region. The increase in hardship causes the 
agents to make different decisions and form or leave rebel groups. If not taking into 
consideration possible costs of secession or national attachment, as severity increases most 
agents would choose to rebel against their state (as there would be no reason to remain passive). 
The severity is linear (increasing by .02 per tick, until reaching a cap of 2.00)1 for the same 
reason that the Costs-of-Secession are the same for each agent: even though this would not 
 
1 .02 with a cap of 2 was used instead of a .01 increase with a cap of 1 solely to increase the speed at which the 
model ran. The difference has no impact on the model’s progression.   
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accurately emulate the real world in which hardship differs from country to country, it is 
necessary because ethnic groups are often separated by state lines and not all conflicts are driven 
by specific actions by one state or another. Oftentimes, it is the culmination of years of 
repression that lead to rebel movements and thus the severity of the situation increases linearly 
throughout the simulation.  
 
Rebellion, Leadership, and Group Formation 
 
The culmination of these attributes and sliders leads to agents making decisions on their 
movements, group preferences, and leadership status. Figure 3 shows the calculation that each 
agent makes in order to decide whether they will rebel or choose to remain neutral; following 
that, if in fact they choose to rebel, then there is a calculation about whether they will be a leader 
or a follower.  
 
Figure 3: Code for Risk/Aversion Calculation 
 
Agents who are in an incredibly severe situation and are highly ethnically driven will be much 
more risky and willing to rebel. However, the costs of seceding and the agents’ predetermined 
patriotic attitude towards their home country are the mediating factors. If an agent’s risk-taking 
motivation is greater than their aversion to rebellion, then they will choose to rebel. The rebel 
agents are then given a leadership score based off of how risky they are and how many resources 
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they have. The higher the leadership score, the higher the chance a rebel agent will choose to 
become a leader of a new rebel group rather than a follower.   
 Leaders move around the map to collect resources and find other agents that would be 
willing to join their rebellion. An agent can fail to be a leader if there are other agents in their 
close proximity that have a higher leadership score; the leader will choose to defer to the better 
or riskier leader and then can become one of their followers. The leaders with the highest amount 
of resources and followers are able to better succeed at creating a long-lasting rebellion. There 
are, however, issues with sustaining such groups. Followers can choose to leave a very large 
group if they are on the outskirts, especially if there is another new, better leader in close 
proximity. The most significant determinant of which agents choose to join a leader’s group is 
the salience of the agents’ specific ethnic group. In hypothetical terms, an agent of Ethnic Group 
A, who is strongly attached to their identity as being part of Ethnic Group A, may hesitate in 
joining with a leader from Ethnic Group B. However, a different agent, who is only moderately 
attached to Ethnic Group A, will see no issue with joining a leader from a different ethnic group. 
These opinions can change over time in the model through the “influences” of surrounding 
agents.  
One of the effects programmed into the model in order to represent a sort of “trickle-
down” effect of attachment to the group leader is the mechanism of influences. There are three 
different influences based off of the vision radius of each agent. Further simplified: if an agent 
has more rebel agents surrounding them, their incentive to rebel will increase. If an agent is 
surrounded with many patriotic agents, their aversion to rebellion increases. The final influence 
is ethnicity, the salience of an agent’s ethnic identity will increase or decrease depending on the 
number of agents that share their same ethnicity in their proximity. These influences were 
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created with the goal of better mimicking real world behaviors; rebellions often do not succeed 
and, as seen in the previously mentioned case studies, the composition of your neighbors impacts 
the chance of the formation of a long-lasting rebel movement.  
 
Ethnic Burnout 
 
 From various case studies concerning rebellions in the region, it is clear that there is some 
factor of burnout when it comes to ethnic conflict. A sense of belonging to an ethnic group is not 
enough to maintain membership in a rebel movement. Ethnic rebellions are often unorganized, 
fleeting, and the fight for minority rights causes a more aggressive approach. In the cases 
discussed earlier, the most successful secessionist movements were those that were well planned, 
had amassed resources (both in weaponry and funds), and had asked for the assistance of other 
ethnic minorities. Pontiac’s War exemplifies this well as with only a single Native group in the 
beginning their plans were easily thwarted, but with planning and the combination of groups, a 
much more successful rebellion was able to be formed. In order for this model to account for the 
large amounts of rebellions that have been extremely short-lived due to the aggressive nature of 
ethnic conflict, a burnout timer was implemented. This timer, as pictured in Figure 4, reduces the 
saliency of a specific ethnic identity over time once an agent is a member or leader of a rebellion.  
 
Figure 4: Code for Ethnic Burnout Timer 
 
The timer allows for groups to disband if the bolstering influences of other agents are not enough 
to maintain the group. Even though the timer reduces the ethnic saliency of the agents, the timer 
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resets if an agent stops rebelling so an agent can once again be ethnically driven if they join 
another group. However, an agent can still choose to remain a rebel even without ethnicity if the 
severity of the situation is high enough and their surroundings are highly influential.  
 
Model Findings 
 
 The following Figure 5 is the final visualization of the model at its conclusion. Through 
the use of the mechanisms mentioned prior, agents flock together in order to form rebel groups. 
In order to quantify if the groups are multi-ethnic, group size measures were used that separated 
groups into small, medium, and large. Small groups being 1% of the total population, medium 
meaning 3% of the total population, and large being any group over 5% of the total population of 
agents in the model. A group could not be considered large if ethnic groups did not consolidate 
as there would not be enough agents in their area of their same ethnicity to form such a group. 
The visualization aspect of the model is also compelling, as exemplified in Figure 5, each group 
has their own specific color. Agents who remain white are non-rebels. The color, while purely 
for aesthetic purposes, highlights the different clusters of groups well; it makes it clear where 
large groups form and if groups are overlapping.  
Throughout viewing hundreds of simulations, large groups easily form within current-day 
Brazil, Venezuela, and Colombia. The lower elevation and higher resources makes it easier for 
agents to collect resources, see other agents, and combine with smaller groups. In countries like 
current-day Peru and Argentina, agents struggle to join together in mass when faced with 
mountainous regions. These findings are supported by case studies of failed rebellions: long or 
treacherous distances between groups limits communication; smaller guerilla groups like the 
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Shining Path in Peru often find it difficult to amass followers as they mostly occupy Peru’s rural, 
mountainous areas. Agents also do not limit themselves to staying within state lines, many agents 
when faced with groups of ethnically similar individuals will be easily influenced to cross state 
lines even if there is more risk involved.   
 
Figure 5: Netlogo Interface at Finish (Ethnic attachment = .05) 
 
In support of Horowitz’s claims that the costs of secession are so extremely high that 
many groups have no chance of succeeding, there is a significant relationship (r = -.84) between 
the level of cost and the number of groups that can form. Without any cost, numerous multi-
ethnic rebellions are able to succeed and grow throughout the simulation but very few flourish 
when costs are high, as seen in the following Figure 6 and Figure 7. In some runs of the model, 
rebellions fail to form entirely when the cost is set at maximum. 
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Figure 6: Costs of Secession’s impact on group formation 
 
Figure 7: Multiple linear regression analysis 
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However, what was unexpected was the very similar result for the first four levels of costs. There 
is little difference between the average amount of large groups formed when costs equal to either 
0 or .5. A baseline of ethnicity is enough to surpass the price of rebellion until the large drop-off 
at level 1.5. The agents’ ethnic and minority ties are able to sustain a rebellion until the costs 
become too high and pass between the 1.5 and 2 thresholds. This makes sense when considering 
the scaling which represents level 0 costs as no intervention and level 2 costs as international 
backlash. Even with costs presenting a challenge, highly ethnic agents will choose to rebel 
anyway. 
  
Figure 8: The relationship between severity and rebellions (Ethnic attachment = .06 - .08) 
 
An unexpected finding that arose from multiple runs of the model is the exact pattern of 
population rebellion. It was expected that there would be a linear relationship between the 
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severity of the situation and the number of agents that chose to rebel against their states. In 
actuality, starting at 20% severity there is a decline until around 35-36% severity in the amount 
of rebel agents, this number then rebounds and continues to increase until reaching the cap of all 
agents rebelling, as seen in the above Figure 8. This phenomenon is present for numerous 
reasons. The initial rebelling agents are highly ethnic and extremely passionate about their cause, 
even without a very severe situation their ethnic identities are so salient and their risk-taking 
score so high that they are willing to rebel. However, these agents burn out quickly: there are not 
enough people willing to join them yet, they are surrounded by non-rebel agents who influence 
them to stop rebelling, and their burnout timer begins without the mediating factor of gathered 
resources. All of the agents who are ethnically motivated, but who waited for resources and 
higher hardship, are the next people who rebel in the second wave. The second wave agents are 
then in a position where agents who rebel due to the severe situation join them under their 
leadership. This information supports the idea that a lower saliency ethnic identity can be used in 
order to form rebel groups; a severe situation is necessary to create large rebellions, but high 
ethnic group attachment is not. The most successful second wave agents were still ethnic but 
succeeded because their attachment to their own personal ethnic group was not unduly high. 
These individuals were able to attract agents from outside their own ethnic group due to their 
own moderate values.  
 The relationship between ethnic attachment and the number of multi-ethnic groups is a 
bit more difficult to interpret. While there is a positive correlation between the number of large 
groups and the level of ethnic attachment (r = .16), the relationship is very weak; this is because 
it should be expected that if agents are highly attached to their ethnic identity, they will refuse to 
join with others of a different ethnicity. Agents with a moderately strong attachment to their 
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ethnicity are more likely to be able to join with a group of different others. There is a much 
stronger relationship between ethnic attachment and total number of groups (r = .39), as with a 
higher level of ethnic attachment, many more small, single ethnicity rebellions form.  
 
 
Figure 9: The issue with high ethnic attachment (Ethnic Attachment = .80, Tick = 100) 
 
The image, Figure 9, above shows the problematic nature of attempting to consolidate 
rebellions. There are many clusters of numerous colors; multiple rebellions co-exist in the same 
area without consolidating because they are of different ethnic backgrounds. As there is no other 
mechanism impacting the joining together of groups, only the problem of highly salient 
ethnicities is preventing them from consolidating. The high ethnic attachment score of .80 causes 
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even moderately opinioned leaders to attract only members of the own ethnic group. In the 
earlier Figure 5, the ethnic attachment was set to .05 and the groups are much clearer and 
uniform. However, no matter the ethnic attachment, if the costs were not completely 
overwhelming, ethnic consolidation occurs. For each level of ethnic attachment, there are 
numerous widespread movements of multi-ethnic groups.  
 
Variations to the Model 
 
 The model could easily be adapted to fit the circumstances of any country facing ethnic 
conflict. Using the sliders and a scale such as the Gini index in order to determine level of 
inequality, any country’s specific situation could be shown in the model. Additionally, with an 
import of a different image file and elevation data, the mapping of the possible outcome of a 
country’s ability to sustain widespread ethnic rebellion would be visible. For example, in a 
country like Bolivia, it would be possible to see if the Aymara people during the Katarista era 
were in a favorable position to be able to collect resources and slowly spread, leading to their 
success in changes for Native rights in the 1980s.  
 Improvements or edits to the model primarily include the impact of severity. For the 
purposes of this paper, severity was linear and impacted the entire region identically. This, of 
course, is not representative of the real world, but did not specifically impact the questions asked 
in this research paper. However, edits to the severity clock can be made to change from the linear 
pattern and furthermore (using lists) severity could be programmed to represent a real timeline 
for one country or another. Severity and costs could also be set individually per country which 
would also increase the generalizability to the real world. The implementation of police or other 
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governmental backlash could also be a change used to heighten the model’s realism; including 
agents who could repress rebellions may lead to interesting results of the number of agents 
needed to quell uprisings.  
 In the past, ethnically dissimilar individuals and groups have combined in order to be 
more effective against the state or colonizer, however, that does not necessarily mean that the 
consolidation is either long term or permanent; after the struggle is over, there is less of a bond 
between different ethnic groups and a common enemy is not enough to sustain a rebellion 
(Horowitz, 2014, p.10). The model does not attempt to show what the rebellions or groups would 
look like after the end of severity; this model took into consideration that Latin America has 
faced systematic inequality and repression throughout its history and up until present, the 
situation of equality is and will be poor.  
 
Conclusion  
 
 Historical evidence supports that ethnic groups in Latin America have combined in order 
to be more effective in a conflict. Due to the highly repressive and continuously unequal 
situation that ethnic minorities in Latin America have faced, those who label themselves as 
“ethnic” are able to join with others in a similar situation, no matter their ethnicity. The Netlogo 
agent-based model supports numerous ideas: 
1. More moderately opinioned agents are successful at starting rebellions, “second-wave” 
agents who collect resources and followers slowly are able to expand and join with other 
moderately opinioned groups. 
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2. Due to the ethnic burnout found in passionate ethnic conflict, a region with groups that all 
have highly salient ethnic group identities will form more small, fleeting rebellions than 
large multi-ethnic groups. 
3. Costs of secession and rebellion are a severe factor limiting widespread rebellion, but the 
factor of being ethnically attached is able to sustain rebellion formation until reaching a 
high threshold of costs. 
These ideas point towards one feasible theory concerning the cases discussed earlier in this 
paper. It is possible that ethnicity can be both a dividing and combining force when 
understanding conflict between minorities and the repressive state or majority. In a case like 
Bolivia, Natives have joined forces to push forth candidates, have staged massive protests, and 
have been able to make changes to Bolivia’s Constitution concerning Native rights. These 
positive changes would not have been possible without group consolidation. In other parts of the 
world, with less severe situations, the consolidation may not be possible, but with Latin 
America’s problems of corruption, drug trafficking, and under-representation, a highly severe 
situation may be able to sustain moderately ethnic, consolidated rebel movements.   
Despite these claims, of course there have been instances of violent ethnic conflict between 
nearby tribes and ethnic minorities and times of hardship without moves towards rebellion or 
secession.  
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